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Venezuela	elections	2018:	military	and	institutional
backing	could	keep	Maduro	in	power	despite
sanctions
Further	economic	deterioration	and	more	drastic	international	sanctions	resulting	from	a	Maduro	‘win’
will	only	reinforce	his	linchpin	of	high-level	military	support,	writes	Diego	Moya	Ocampos	(IHS	Markit).
Venezuela	is	holding	a	presidential	election	on	20	May	2018	in	which	incumbent	president	Nicolás
Maduro,	in	power	since	2013,	hopes	to	extend	the	United	Socialist	Party	of	Venezuela’s	(PSUV)	rule	for
six	more	years.
Venezuelans	are	returning	to	the	polls	at	a	time	of	severe	political	and	economic	crisis	(Carlos
Adampol	Galindo,	CC	BY-SA	2.0)
Politics	amidst	economic	crisis
Maduro’s	popularity	has	been	significantly	undermined	by	severe	shortages	of	food,	basic	goods,	and	medicines,	as
well	as	periodic	water	rationing,	blackouts,	and	a	prolonged	recession	(since	2013).	Venezuela’s	economy	is	likely	to
contract	at	least	15%	in	2018	and	inflation	will	be	as	high	as	8000%.
Economic	recovery	in	Venezuela	is	only	possible	through	its	oil	sector,	which	represents	25%	of	GDP,	50%	of	fiscal
revenues,	and	97%	of	export	revenues.	However,	oil	production	has	fallen	43%	since	2015	and	currently	stands	at
1.5	million	barrels	per	day,	according	to	the	Organisation	of	the	Petroleum	Exporting	Countries	(OPEC).
The	US	last	year	imposed	sanctions	on	the	issuance	of	new	debt	and	equity	issued	by	the	Venezuelan	government
and	state	oil	company	PDVSA,	although	with	Venezuelan	debt	trading	at	45	percentage	points	above	US	Treasury
yields,	private-sector	lending	and	new	bond	sales	are	practically	impossible,	as	markets	are	assuming	heavy	losses
from	future	debt	restructuring.
The	only	opposition	candidate	who	might	benefit	from	this	parlous	state	of	affairs	is	Henri	Falcón	of	the	Progressive
Advance	Party	(AP).	He	was	expelled	from	the	dominant	opposition	Democratic	Unity	Roundtable	(MUD)	coalition,
which	is	boycotting	the	election	and	calling	it	a	“farce”.	Most	polls	have	shown	Falcón	leading	by	over	10	percentage
points	but	the	international	community	and	the	MUD	claim	that	minimum	conditions	for	a	free	and	fair	election	will	not
be	met.
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As	such,	the	election	will	not	be	recognised	by	most	of	the	international	community,	including	the	US,	the	EU,
Canada,	and	Latin	American	countries	like	Argentina,	Brazil,	Chile,	Colombia,	Peru,	and	Panama.	These	states	are
calling	for	postponement,	appointment	of	a	new	National	Electoral	Council	(CNE),	and	reform	of	the	electoral	system.
The	post-election	political,	economic,	and	international	outlook
The	most	likely	scenario	is	that	Maduro	will	be	re-elected	thanks	to	divisions	within	the	opposition	and	governmental
influence	on	the	military	and	the	CNE.	Falcón	is	likely	to	recognise	the	results	and	potentially	engage	in	a	national
dialogue	with	the	government	in	order	to	explore	ways	to	stabilise	the	economy.
US	targeting	of	the	Venezuelan	oil	industry	could	aggravate	its	current	frailty	(Voice	of	America,
public	domain)
The	US,	however,	may	well	respond	to	allegedly	fraudulent	elections	with	sanctions	targeting	the	oil	sector.	This
could	involve	bans	on	Venezuelan	oil	imports	to	the	US,	exports	of	US	diluent	to	Venezuela,	or	transactions	in	US
dollars	involving	PDVSA.	This	is	critical	as	Venezuela	is	already	in	technical	default	on	sovereign	and	PDVSA	debt
due	to	its	repeated	failure	to	make	timely	payments	within	grace	periods.
The	most	likely	scenario	is	one	of	further	economic	deterioration	due	to	economic	mismanagement	and	sanctions.
The	population	will	increasingly	rely	on	government	food	programmes	such	as	CLAP	food	bags,	which	are	delivered
weekly	to	civil	servants	and	low-income	areas.	This	system	is	also	likely	to	be	hit	by	international	sanctions,	however,
as	these	sanctions	will	make	it	harder	for	the	government	to	import	food	and	basic	goods.
The	combination	of	international	sanctions,	lower	oil	production,	and	weak	international	oil	prices	is	likely	to	intensify
shortages	of	food	and	basic	goods,	as	well	as	undermining	the	country’s	already	crumbling	energy	and	utility
infrastructure.	Protests	and	riots	will	continue	to	be	common,	with	an	average	of	30	protests	already	occurring	daily.
Likewise,	looting	of	supermarkets,	pharmacies,	and	retail	stores	will	continue.
The	potential	for	protests	to	destabilise	the	government	will	be	mitigated	by	the	mass	migration	of	discontented
Venezuelans	to	Colombia	and	elsewhere	in	the	region.	Colombian	authorities	estimate	that	more	than	a	million
Venezuelans	have	already	relocated	to	Colombia.
The	crucial	role	of	the	military
More	broadly,	Maduro	increasingly	relies	on	the	military	for	his	survival.	And	the	weaker	Maduro	becomes,	the	more
power	military	commanders	will	obtain,	largely	behind	the	scenes.
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Senior	military	officials,	represented	by	the	High	Military	Command,	will	continue	to	control	much	of	the	formal
economy,	from	oil,	ports,	and	airports	to	imports	of	basic	goods	(which	many	arrange	through	intermediaries	and
shell	companies).	But	they	will	also	continue	control	informal	market	channels	linked	to	drug	trafficking,	illegal	mining,
and	fuel	smuggling.
Their	privileged	position	reduces	the	risk	of	a	military	coup	and	increases	the	chance	of	strong	repression	of	protests
in	poorer	areas.	Security	forces	have	shown	themselves	to	be	capable	of	containing	protests,	including	looting,
before	it	becomes	widespread	and	threatens	the	stability	of	the	government.
So	far,	discontent	among	the	middle	ranks	in	the	military	and	the	police	force	has	only	served	to	trigger	purges,	and
this	is	likely	to	continue.	Any	attempt	to	stage	a	coup	could	end	in	failure	without	the	support	of	the	military’s	upper
echelons.
The	military	might	consider	withdrawing	its	support	only	in	one	of	two	improbable	scenarios:
1.	 Falcón	manages	to	secure	an	electoral	majority;
2.	 Widespread	protests	and	looting	escalate	beyond	the	containment	capacity	of	the	security	forces.
Trade	relations	with	Russia	and	China	are	a	key	indicator	of	government	and	policy	stability.	Venezuela	is	becoming
increasingly	dependent	on	these	sources	for	funding,	credit,	and	the	scope	to	sell	and	transport	oil	outside	of
Venezuela,	especially	if	sanctions	are	extended.
A	second	major	issue	is	that	a	Maduro	win	could	see	Venezuela’s	relations	with	Colombia	deteriorate.	This	has
become	more	likely	due	to	the	increased	flow	of	migrants	and	allegations	from	the	Colombian	government	that	the
insurgent	National	Liberation	Army	(ELN)	operates	freely	in	Venezuelan	territory.	These	factors	are	likely	to	generate
further	regional	pressure	for	new	sanctions.
Notes:
•	The	views	expressed	here	are	of	the	authors	and	do	not	reflect	the	position	of	the	Centre	or	of	the	LSE
•	The	title	and	introduction	to	this	piece	were	modified	on	17	May	2018
•	Please	read	our	Comments	Policy	before	commenting
Diego	Moya	Ocampos	–	IHS	Markit
Diego	Moya	Ocampos	is	a	Principal	Analyst	for	Country	Risk	at	IHS	Markit	in	the	Americas	team,
covering	the	political,	security	and	business	environment	in	Latin	American	countries.	He	holds	a
Master	of	Science	in	Environmental	Policy	and	Regulation	from	the	London	School	of	Economics
(LSE).
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